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The behavior of bank interest spreads in Brazil reveal two stylized facts. First, a 
remarkable fall in the average rates since early 1999. Second, a strong and 
persistent dispersion of rates across banks. Such stylized facts suggest that both 
the time series and the cross section dimensions are important elements to 
understand the trend of the bank interest spread in the country. 
This paper makes use of panel data techniques to uncover the main determinants 
of the bank interest spreads in Brazil. A question that the paper aims to address is 
whether macro or microeconomic factors are the most relevant ones affecting the 
behavior of such rates. A two-step approach due to Ho and Saunders (1981) is 
employed to measure the relative relevance of the micro and the macro elements. 
The roles played by the inflation rate, risk premium, economic activity, required 
reserves (all macroeconomic factors) and CAMEL-type indicators 
(microeconomic factors) are highlighted. The results suggest that macroeconomic 
variables are the most relevant factors to explain the behavior of bank interest 
spread in Brazil. 
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1.   Introduction 
Bank interest rates have been the focus of recent (October 1999) policy attention by the 
Brazilian Central Bank. In a highly publicised report
1, this institution showed a great concern 
for the high levels of the bank loan interest rates observed in the country. This report 
concluded that high default levels as well as high operating costs are amongst the main 
culprits for the high bank interest margin seen in the country. 
The economic and policy relevance of such topic is beyond any questioning. However, the 
Central Bank report lacks a more formal approach to support their main conclusions. The 
decomposition of the bank interest margin among different factors is based on accounting 
identities and on a restricted sample of banks rather than on a bank profit maximization 
model. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an econometric account of the main determinants of 
the bank interest margin in Brazil. The study makes use of the two-step regression approach 
advanced by Ho and Saunders (1981) to uncover the influence of bank characteristic variables 
as well as macroeconomic influences as the main explanatory factors of the bank spread in the 
country. 
The paper is structured as follows: after this Introduction, section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature. Section 3 overviews the recent behavior of bank interest rates in Brazil. Section 4 
describes the methodology to be applied in the paper. Section 5 introduces the empirical 
model to be estimated. Section 6 deals with the sample and data issues. Section 7 presents the 
main results. Section 8 summarizes the main findings and concludes the paper. 
2. Literature  Review 
In a comprehensive study, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) investigate the determinants 
of bank interest margins using bank-level data for 80 countries in the years 1988-1995. The 
set of regressors include several variables accounting for bank characteristics, macroeconomic 
conditions, explicit and implicit bank taxation, deposit insurance regulation, overall financial 
                                                       
1 See Banco Central do Brasil (1999) and the 2000 and 2001 follow-ups.  
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structure, and underlying legal and institutional indicators. The variables accounting for bank 
characteristics and macroeconomic factors are of special interest since they are close to the 
ones included in the regression estimated in our paper. 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga report that the bank interest margin is positively influenced by 
the ratio of equity to lagged total assets, by the ratio of loans to total assets, by a foreign 
ownership dummy, by bank size as measured by total bank assets, by the ratio of overhead 
costs to total assets, by inflation rate, and by the short-term market interest rate in real terms. 
The ratio of non-interest earning assets to total assets, on the other hand, is negatively related 
to the bank interest margin. All the mentioned variables are statistically significant. Output 
growth, by contrast, does not seem to have any impact on bank spread. 
Another branch of the literature is concerned with the adjustments of bank interest rates to the 
market interest rate
2. These studies show that, in the long run, one cannot reject the hypothesis 
that bank interest rates follow the market interest rate in a one-to-one basis, i.e. that there is 
full adjustment to changes in the market interest rate. In the short-run, though, the departures 
of bank interest rates from the market interest rate are relevant and there is some evidence that 
adjustments towards the long run equilibrium are asymmetric, i.e. the adjustment varies 
according to whether one observes positive or negative unbalances. 
There is some evidence of price rigidity in local deposit markets with decreases in deposit 
interest rates being more likely than increases in these rates in the face of changes in the 
market interest rate [Hannan and Berger (1991)]. One reason for such behavior is market 
concentration: banks in concentrated markets were found to exacerbate the asymmetric 
adjustments [Neumark and Sharpe (1992)]. 
The same sluggishness has been observed for the loan interest rate. Cottarelli and Kourelis 
(1994) apply a two-step approach to investigate the reasons for the stickiness of bank lending 
rates for a sample of countries. In the first step, the impact multipliers of changes in the 
market interest rate are calculated for each country in the sample. In the second step, such 
impact multipliers are regressed against a large set of explanatory variables controlling for 
cross-country differences in the competition within the banking system, in the extent of 
                                                       
2 See, among others, Hannan and Berger (1991), Neumark and Sharpe (1992), Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), 
Cottarelli et al. (1995), Scholnick (1996), and Heffernan (1997).  
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money market development and openness of the economy, in the banking system ownership, 
and in the degree of development of the financial system. Of interest are the results that the 
impact multiplier is higher for countries where inflation is higher and where public banks do 
not dominate the banking systems. 
Angbazo (1997) studies the determinants of bank net interest margins for a sample of US 
banks using annual data for 1989-1993. The empirical model for the net interest margin is 
postulated to be a function of the following variables: default risk, interest rate risk, an 
interaction between default and interest risk, liquidity risk, leverage, implicit interest 
payments, opportunity cost of non-interest bearing reserves, management efficiency, and a 
dummy for states with branch restrictions. The results for the pooled sample suggest that the 
proxies for default risk (ratio of net loan charge-offs to total loans), the opportunity cost of 
non-interest bearing reserves, leverage (ratio of core capital to total assets), and management 
efficiency (ratio of earning assets to total assets) are all statistically significant and positively 
related to bank interest margins. The ratio of liquid assets to total liabilities, a proxy for low 
liquidity risk, is inversely related to the bank interest margin. The other variables were not 
significant in statistical terms. 
Some recent contributions have made use of more structural models based on profit 
maximization assumptions for banks operating in imperfect markets to develop empirical 
equations to understand the behavior of bank interest rates. Recent contributions include 
Barajas et al. (1999) for Colombia, Catão (1998) for Argentina, and Randall (1998) for the 
Eastern Caribbean region. 
Barajas et al. (1999) document significant effects of financial liberalization on bank interest 
spreads for the Colombian case. Although the overall spread has not reduced with the 
financial liberalization measures undertook in the early 1990s, the relevance of the different 
factors behind bank spreads were affected by such measures. 
In a single equation specification, the bank lending rate is regressed against the ratio of the 
deposit rate to (one minus) the reserve ratio, a scale variable represented by the volume of 
total loans, wages, and a measure of loan quality given by the percentage of nonperforming 
loans. A test for market power is performed with the results showing that the banking sector 
in Colombia was imperfect before the liberalization but that a competitive industry describes 
the data well in the post-liberalization period. Another change linked with the liberalization  
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process was an increase in the coefficient of loan quality after the liberalization. The authors 
notice that “this change could signal a heightened awareness on the part of bank managers 
regarding credit risk, and/or it could reflect an improved reporting of nonperforming loans” 
(p. 212). A negative sign found for the scale variable indicates that economies of scale are 
prevalent for both periods. 
The regression results are then used to decompose the bank intermediation spread into four 
factors: financial taxation (reserve requirements and forced investments), operating costs, 
market power, and loan quality. For the pre-liberalization period, operating costs made up 
about 38% of bank spread while market power, financial taxation and loan quality accounted 
for 36%, 22% and 4% of the spread, respectively. For the post-liberalization period, the 
impact of market power is set equal to zero to be consistent with the regression results. Loan 
quality now accounts for 29% of the spread while operating costs and financial taxation were 
responsible for, respectively, 45% and 26% of the spread. 
Unlike other Latin American countries, Argentina used to operate a currency board 
arrangement with the widespread use of foreign currency (US dollar) alongside the domestic 
one. Domestic banks are allowed to intermediate freely in domestic as well as in foreign 
currency. 
Using monthly data for Argentinean banks for the June 1993 to July 1997 period, Catão 
(1998) studies the determinants of the intermediation spread for loan and deposits 
denominated both in domestic as well as in foreign currencies. Both intermediation margins 
are related to the average tax ratio, to the cost of reserve requirements, to operating costs, to 
problem loans, to the exchange rate risk, and to the market structure as measured by the 
Herfindahl index. 
The only marked difference between the domestic and foreign currency markets is a positive 
and significant impact of the market structure on spread for the former markets and a non-
significant impact for the latter. Catão observes that such difference reflects “the fact that 
most peso borrowers cannot arbitrage between domestic and foreign sources of funds, thus 
becoming subject to the monopoly power of local banks” (p. 21). By contrast, “interbank 
competition for the typical US dollar borrower is bound to be considerably fiercer and the 
scope for banks to exert monopoly power over the client is therefore much reduced” (p. 21).  
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For both markets, the intermediation spreads are mostly affected by operating costs and 
problem loans. The quantitative effects of both factors are nearly the same for the domestic 
currency market while operating costs seem to be more important than problem loans in the 
US dollar market. The impact of reserve requirements on spread is economically small 
“reflecting the fact that banks' reserves at the Central Bank are remunerated at interest rates 
close to that of time deposits” (p. 21). 
Randall (1998) documents that for the Eastern Caribbean countries
3, unlike the evidence 
gathered above, the impact of loan loss provisioning has been to reduce bank interest margin 
rather than to increase it once the tendency of banks to under provision in the case of 
government loans is accounted for. Like in other countries, operating expenses seem to have a 
large impact on bank spreads in the Eastern Caribbean region. Over the sample period, the 
ratio of operating expenses to total asset explains 23% of the estimated spread. 
Ho and Saunders (1981) advocate a two-step procedure to explain the determinants of bank 
interest spreads in panel data samples.
4 In the first-step, a regression for the bank interest 
margin is run against a set of bank-specific variables such as non-performing loans, operating 
costs, the capital asset ratio, etc. plus time dummies. The time dummy coefficients of such 
regressions are interpreted as being a measure of the “pure” component of a country's bank 
spread. In the second-step, the constant terms are regressed against variables reflecting 
macroeconomic factors. For this second step, the inclusion of a constant term aims at 
capturing the influence of factors such as market structure or risk-aversion coefficient, which 
reflect neither bank-specific observed characteristics or macroeconomic elements. 
Brock and Rojas-Suarez (2000) apply the two-step procedure for a sample of five Latin 
American countries during the mid 1990’s (Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, and Peru)
5. 
For each country, the first-stage regressions for the bank interest spread include variables 
controlling for non-performing loans, capital ratio, operating costs, a measure of liquidity (the 
                                                       
3 The Eastern Caribbean region is comprised by the following countries, in alphabetical order: Anguilla, Antigua 
and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
These countries share a common currency and a common central bank. 
4 Section 4 discusses this approach in more detail. 
5 The period of analysis varies for each country: January 1995 to April 1996 for Argentina, February 1992 to 
April 1996 for Bolivia, February 1991 to March 1996 for Colombia, April 1991 to April 1995 for Chile, and 
March 1993 to April 1996 for Peru.  
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ratio of short term assets to total deposits) and time dummies. The coefficients on the time 
dummies are estimates of the “pure” spread. 
Their results show positive coefficients for capital ratio (statistically significant for Bolivia 
and Colombia), cost ratio (statistically significant for Argentina and Bolivia), and the liquidity 
ratio (statistically significant for Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru). As for the effects of non-
performing loans, the evidence is mixed. Apart from Colombia, where the coefficient for non-
performing loans is positive and statistically significant, for the other countries the coefficient 
is negative (statistically significant for Argentina and Peru). The authors explain these 
findings as “a result of inadequate provisioning for loan losses: higher non-performing loans 
would reduce banks’ income, thereby lowering the spread in the absence of adequate loan loss 
reserves” (p. 130). The result for Argentina is striking given the opposite findings reported by 
Catão (1998). 
In the second stage, Brock and Rojas-Suarez (2000) run a regression for the measure of 
“pure” bank spreads on macroeconomic variables reflecting interest rate volatility, inflation 
rate and GDP growth rate. Their results show that interest rate volatility increases bank spread 
in Bolivia and Chile; the same happens with inflation in Colombia, Chile and Peru. For the 
other cases, the coefficients are not statistically significant. 
On balance, bank spreads in Bolivia are explained by micro variables, while bank spreads in 
Chile and Colombia are accounted for by both macro and micro factors. As for Argentina and 
Peru, there is still a large fraction of the spread that cannot be explained by any of the above 
factors. 
In addition to the studies concerning Latin American countries, Saunders and Schumacher 
(2000) apply Ho and Saunders two-step method to a sample of banks of seven OECD 
countries (namely Germany, Spain, France, Great Britain, Italy, United States and 
Switzerland). The purpose of the authors is to decompose the determinants of bank net 
interest margins into regulatory, market structure and risk premium components. 
Among the three control variables used in the first step, the one with the major impact is the 
implicit interest rate, a fee proxy. That is, for almost all countries, banks have to increase 
margins to finance implicit interest payments. Besides that, the coefficients for the  
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opportunity cost of reserves were positive and significant in most countries and years. At last, 
bank capital ratios were also in general significant and positive. 
The intercepts of these first step regressions can be understood as the common pure spread 
across all banks in a single country at the same time. The authors then ran a cross-country 
second step regression, in which the dependent variable was the estimated pure spreads from 
the first step. This second stage is supposed to measure the sensitivity of the margins with 
respect to market structure and interest rate volatility. The results showed that, first, the more 
segmented and restricted the system is, the higher the spreads are, probably due to the 
monopoly power, and, second, that the volatility of interest rate has also a significant impact 
on the margins. These findings suggest that the pure spreads are sensitive to both, market 
structure and volatility effects, and also that the effects are quite heterogeneous across 
countries. 
3.   Recent Evolution of Bank Interest Rates in Brazil 
The Brazilian banking system has traditionally been characterized by high lending rates and 
low levels of credit as a proportion of GDP. Recently, with inflation under control and a 
stable macroeconomic environment there has been a notable trend towards a more balanced 
credit market, with a vigorous fall in bank interest margins and an increase in credit. 
Figure 1 illustrates the behavior of the bank interest spread in Brazil for both the corporate 
and the personal sectors. Since 1995, interest spreads in Brazil have been in a downward 
trend. The overall interest spread has fallen from a rate of 135% p.a. at the beginning of 1995 
to 35% p.a. in early 2001.   
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The stabilization plan (Plano Real) launched in July 1994 succeeded in controlling inflation 
rates and creating a more stable macroeconomic environment. As a result, the basic interest 
rate reduced (excepting the immediate post-Real period, when the government introduced 
very restrictive temporary policies to control credit expansion
6, and periods of external 
shocks) and output growth resumed. 
In 1999, the Brazilian government adopted some measures with the declared purpose of 
curbing banks’ spread, namely a gradual reduction of reserve requirements – from 75% to 
45% for demand deposits and from 20% to zero for time deposits – and cuts in financial 
market taxation for household loans – from 6% to 1.5%, same level of corporate loans.
7 
Figure 2 illustrates that the drop in the spread rates since mid-1999 was simultaneous to an 
expansion of freely allocated credit in the economy. Total freely allocated loans in the 
banking system increased 127% in the two-year period from April 1999 to April 2001, rising 
from R$ 44 billion to R$ 100 billion. It is important to emphasize though that overall credit in 
                                                       
6 Those measures included a marginal 100% reserve requirement on time deposits and a 15% reserve 
requirement on loans, causing a sharp increase in bank interest spreads at the end of 1994/beginning of 1995. 
7 In addition to these measures, some other changes were also implemented, including the following: new credit 
risk rating system and provisioning rules; broadening of the coverage of loan transactions reported to the Central 
Bank risk bureau (central de risco); public availability of interest rates charged on overdraft accounts by each 
bank; creation of certificates of bank credit (cédulas de crédito bancário), a new bond supposed to be easier to 
recover when defaulted.  



















































Total Freely Allocated Loans
the economy has increased in a more moderate term. Directed credit in the economy 
(including housing and rural credit) has even declined, allowing overall credit to stay stable at 
29 percent of GDP, notwithstanding the strong growth in free credit observed in Figure 2. 





Despite the entire recent downward trend observed for the bank spread in Brazil, such rates 
are still very high by international standards. Table 1 compares the observed spread interest 
rates for Brazil and other selected countries. The difference in the bank spread observed in 
Brazil and those observed for the developed countries is of one order of magnitude, i.e. ten 
times or larger. Even when Latin America is taken as the benchmark, Brazil tops the list in 
spite of the drastic drop observed in 2000.
8 
                                                       
8 The purpose of the table is just to illustrate the orders of magnitude of the bank interest rates found in different 
countries. We recognize that financial systems across the world are very heterogeneous and therefore cross-
country comparisons should be viewed with caution.  
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Table 1: Spread Rates for Selected Developed and Latin American Countries – % p.a. 
Spread Rates (lending - deposit rates)  Inflation 
 
1995  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  2000 
Developed Countries           
USA  2.91  2.88 2.82 2.88 2.66 2.77  3.4 
Canada  1.50  1.73 1.37 1.57 1.53 1.57  2.7 
Australia 3.79  4.14  4.19  3.37  -  4.66  4.5 
Japan 2.50  2.36  2.15  2.05 2.04 2.00  -0.6 
UK 2.58  2.91  2.95  2.73  -  -  2.9 
Euro  Area  -  4.80 4.18 3.53 3.20 3.15  2.3 
Latin America           
Argentina  5.95  3.15 2.27 3.08 2.99 2.75  -0.9 
Bolivia  32.15  36.81 35.32 26.59 23.11 23.62  4.6 
BRAZIL  *  130.45 67.79 54.62 60.71 57.50 38.72  7.0 
BRAZIL  **  -  -  53.84 58.36 54.42 38.57  7.0 
Chile  4.43  3.91 3.65 5.26 4.07 5.64  3.8 
Colombia  10.38 10.84  10.09 9.66  9.08 14.21  9.5 
Mexico  20.47  12.19  9.89  14.95 16.26 11.96  9.5 
Peru 11.46  11.17  14.95  15.69 14.52 14.62  3.8 
Uruguay  60.86  63.39 51.94 42.84 39.03 36.94  4.8 
Venezuela  15.02 11.83 8.99 11.51  10.85 8.90  16.2 
Source:  Brazil*: our calculation  
    Brazil** and Other Countries: IMF, International Financial Statistics, lines 601 and 60p 
The last column of Table 1 shows that the difference in the interest spreads cannot be 
explained on the basis of inflation differentials among the countries. Inflation in Brazil was 
lower than inflation in Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela. 
Table 2 compares the simple correlation coefficients of the bank spread with the loan and 
deposit rates for Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Mexico. Different from other Latin American 
countries, the variation of the interest spread in Brazil is strongly correlated with both the loan 
and deposit rates. For the other Latin American countries, the loan rates impact more 
significantly the spread, probably due to the fact that the deposit interest rate in these 
countries are set in accordance to the behavior of international interest rates.  
  14 
Table 2: Correlation of Spread with Loan and Deposit Rates for Selected Latin American 
Countries (1991/96) 
Country  Loan Rate  Deposit Rate 
Brazil (1994-2000)  0.97  0.87 
Argentina 0.89  0.05 
Chile 0.75  0.22 
Mexico 0.42  -0.33 
Source:  Brazil – our calculation 
Other Countries – Brock and Rojas-Suarez (2000) 
  
In addition to the high-observed temporal variation of the bank interest rates in Brazil it is 
also worth highlighting the important cross-sectional dispersion of such rates. Table 3 
computes the coefficients of variation for the loan, deposit and spread rates both over time 
and across banks for all the banks in the country.
9  
Table 3: Coefficients of Variation for the Loan, Deposit and Spread Rates 





Over Time  Across Banks  Over Time 
Across 
Banks 
1997  0.0931 0.4436 0.2634  0.5413  0.0491 0.5435 
1998  0.0771 0.4038 0.1839  0.4877  0.0607 0.5221 
1999  0.1451 0.4222 0.3467  0.5679  0.0843 0.5459 
2000 0.0820  0.5402  0.0524  0.6758  0.1363  0.5479 
1997-2000  0.1701 0.4656 0.3111  0.5266  0.1427 0.4870 
 
The results of Table 3 show that the cross-section dispersion of the interest rates is even more 
pronounced than the temporal variation. Such across banks dispersion is observed for all the 
three bank rates. Table 3 also shows that the cross-section dispersion of interest rates has not 
significantly changed over the years. 
                                                       
9 The coefficient of variation is the ratio of the standard-error to the mean of the corresponding series. The 
column “Over Time” shows the coefficients of variation when the individual observations that make the series 
up are the average rates (for all the banks) for each month. In contrast, the column “Across Banks” shows the 
coefficients of variation when the observations that make the series up are the average rates (for every month) 
for each bank.  
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The same evidence can be gathered by the observation of Figure 3. This figure shows, for 
each month, the minimum and maximum lending rates observed in the market for the universe 
of banks in the country. One can see that the dispersion is not only quite significant but also 
very persistent over time.
10 
































































































































































The temporal variation of the interest spreads observed in Brazil, the still high levels of such 
rates, the dispersion of rates charged across banks, and the persistence of such dispersion 
justify our use of panel data techniques to analyze the behavior of the interest margins in the 
country. Specifically, our aim is to decompose the main determinants of the interest spread 
into microeconomic (inefficiencies or lack of competition of the sector, for example) and 
macroeconomic (volatility of the basic interest rate, inflation and economic growth) variables. 
4. Methodology 
The methodology to be applied to the data borrows from the two-step approach advanced by 
Ho and Saunders (1981). Their applied methodology is based on an adaptation of a model of 
bid-ask prices of security dealers [see, e.g. Ho and Stoll (1980)] to the determination of the 
bank interest margin. 
                                                       
10 The isolated peaks observed in Figure 3 reflect marginal operations performed by very small banks. Part of the 
dispersion may be due to market segmentation strategies pursued by different banks.  
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The representative bank is modeled as a risk-averse agent that acts as a dealer in a market for 
the immediate provision of deposits and loans. It holds illiquid assets and it therefore runs the 
risk of an unbalanced portfolio with either excessive demand for loans or insufficient supply 
of deposits. The bank sets both the deposit and the loan rates with the aim of maximizing a 
mean-variance objective function in end-of-period wealth. 
Depositors and borrowers are supposed to arrive randomly according to Poisson processes. 
Ho and Saunders assume linear symmetric specifications for the Poisson arrival rates of loans 
and deposits: 
b L β α λ − = ,   a D β α λ + =      (1) 
where a and b are the fees charged on deposits and loans. 
The equilibrium bank interest margin has then the following simple specification: 







+ = + =       ( 2 )  
The bank interest spread is thus the sum of two terms. The first term (α/β) is a measure of the 
“risk neutral spread” in the sense that it is the bank spread that would be chosen by a risk 
neutral bank. The risk neutral spread is the ratio of the intercept (α) to the slope (β) of the 
symmetric deposit and loan arrival probability functions. Ho and Saunders interpret this first 
term as a measure of market power, since if a bank faces relatively inelastic demand and 
supply functions in the two markets, it exercises market power by charging a greater spread. 
The second term is a measure of risk premium and it reflects the composition of three 
elements, namely the coefficient of absolute risk aversion (R), the variance of the interest rate 
on net credit inventories (
2
I σ ), and the size of the deposit/loan transaction (Q). 
The basic model was extended by, among others, Allen (1988), McShane and Sharpe (1985), 
and Angbazo (1997) to consider more than one type of loans, other sources of interest rate 
uncertainty, and asymmetric arrival probability functions.  
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Ho and Saunders develop a two-step methodology to empirically evaluate the main 
determinants of the bank interest spread. The first step makes use of a panel of banks to relate 
the bank-level interest spread to a vector of bank observable characteristics plus a set of time 
dummies. The time dummy coefficients are interpreted as a measure of the pure bank spread. 
The time dummy coefficients are then used as the dependent variable in the second step 
regression. The set of regressors in the second step includes a measure of interest rate 
volatility plus other macroeconomic variables. 
This two-step approach has been applied to bank data by Ho and Saunders (1981) and 
Angbazo (1997) for US banks, by McShane and Sharpe (1985) for Australian banks, by 
Brock and Rojas-Suarez (2000) for Latin American banks (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay), and by Saunders and Schumacher (2000) for a bank 
sample for US and six European countries (Germany, Spain, France, Great Britain, Italy, and 
Switzerland). 
5. Empirical  Model 
The empirical model to be estimated in this paper makes use of a panel data set for Brazilian 
banks to implement the two-step approach described in the previous section. The following 
equation is used for the first step: 
it it s ε δ + + + = β X Dγ it         ( 3 )  
where  it s  is the interest spread for bank i in period t (i = 1, ..., N; t = 1, ..., T) measured as the 
difference between the loan and the deposit rates, D  is a set of T time dummy variables taking 
the value one for period t,  it X  is a vector of bank characteristics,  it ε  is the statistical 
disturbance, and δ , γ , and β  are parameters to be estimated. 
The vector of bank characteristics includes the following variables: a) number of bank 
branches; b) the ratio of non-interest bearing deposits to total operational assets; c) the ratio of 
interest-bearing funds to total earning assets; d) operating costs; e) bank liquidity; f) the ratio 
of service revenues to total operational revenues; g) the bank net worth; and h) bank leverage. 
Details on the calculation of each variable are given in section 6.  
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The measure of the pure bank spread is the estimate of  ) ( t γ δ + , where  t γ  is the t
th element in 
the  γ  vector. Let  t ps  denote the estimate of the pure spread. In the second-step of the 
procedure, the following equation is estimated: 
t t u ps + + = λ Zt φ        ( 4 )  
where  t Z  is a vector of macroeconomic variables,  t u  is the statistical disturbance, and φ  and 
λ  are parameters to be estimated. 
The vector of macroeconomic variables contains the market interest rate, a proxy for risk 
premium, the inflation rate, the output growth rate, the required reserve ratio on demand 
deposits, and a financial taxation rate. 
6.  Sample and Data 
Monthly data for all the commercial banks operating in Brazil during the period from 
February 1997 to November 2000 is used in the study. Bank observations that were missing, 
misreported or that constituted clear outliers were excluded from the sample. Banks with less 
than twelve months of observations were also excluded from the sample. The final sample is 
an unbalanced panel data with 142 commercial banks. The total number of observations is 
5,578. The average number of observations per period is 121.3. 
The deposit interest rate is the rate paid on 30-day certificates of deposits. The loan interest 
rate is the average rate charged on fixed-rate free-allocated operations. In other terms, both 
floating-rate operations as well as credit directly channeled through legal requirements 
(mainly credit to the housing and rural sectors) are excluded from the computation of the loan 
rate. 
Both interest rates are posted rates. By contrast, most of the literature makes use of reported 
interest income and interest expenses when computing bank interest margins. The advantage 
of our measure is that the posted rates are more likely to be influenced and to respond to 
changes in the economic environment than interest income and expense. One possible 
drawback of posted rates is that they can be far from the effective rates paid to depositors and 
charged from borrowers due to the exclusion of factors such as payment of fees, commissions,  
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idle resource requirements, etc. in their calculation. Moreover, being an ex ante measure, 
posted rates do not account for loan losses of any nature. 
Balance sheet and income statement data come from COSIF, a monthly report that all 
financial institutions in Brazil are required to submit to the Central Bank. 
The bank characteristic variables included in the first-step regression aim at controlling for 
different individual factors that are due to affect the bank interest spread. The main factors 
considered in the paper include the bank size, its operational policies, and its exposure to risks 
of different kinds. Our proxies for these factors include the number of bank branches, the ratio 
of non-interest bearing deposits to total operational assets, the ratio of interest-bearing funds 
to total earning assets, operating costs, bank liquidity, the ratio of service revenues to total 
operational revenues, bank net worth, the leverage ratio, and a dummy variable for foreign-
controlled banks. 
The number of bank branches (b) is our measure of bank size. The expected sign for this 
variable is not clear a priori. On one side, bigger banks can have more market power, which 
is conducive to higher interest spreads. On the other hand, economies of scale can lead bigger 
banks to operate with lower average costs, which work to reduce bank spreads. Another 
possibility is that, due to market segmentation, some small and specialized banks can operate 
in niche markets charging low lending rates. 
Non-interest bearing deposits are mainly demand deposits. Banks are forbidden by law to pay 
any interest on demand deposits. Total operational assets are total bank assets minus fixed 
assets. The ratio of non-interest bearing deposits to total operational assets (nibd) measures 
the channeling of non-interest-bearing resources to fund bank activities on the asset side. 
Non-interest bearing deposits are less costly than interest-bearing resources. Thus, one can 
expect that banks with higher values for nibd are associated with lower values for the interest 
spread. However, one can also argue that this variable is actually capturing the effect of the 
opportunity cost of non-interest bearing reserves, in which case one would expect a positive 
sign for it in the interest spread equation.
11 
                                                       
11 Courakis (1984) shows that, when banks operate in imperfect markets, it is possible that an increase in the 
reserve requirement ratio can lead to lower interest spread.  
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Moreover, although non-interest bearing deposits may imply less interest costs for the bank, it 
is not clear that banks that rely heavily on non-interest bearing deposits have overall lower 
costs. Due to the distortions created by a long period of high inflation, many Brazilian banks 
developed a large and costly branch network with the aim of attracting non-interest bearing 
deposits subject to inflationary corrosion. 
It is therefore unclear what the expected sign for nibd should be. 
Interest-bearing funds include interest-bearing deposits (mainly passbook savings and time 
deposits) plus purchased funds. Total earning assets are defined as total operational assets less 
the sum of foreign-denominated resources, demand deposits, and public sector resources. 
The ratio of interest-bearing funds to earning assets (ibf) tries to capture the importance of 
costly resources to fund the bank asset activities. The expected sign for this variable is not a 
priori certain due to the same reasons given for the nibd variable. 
Operating cost (opc) is the ratio of administrative costs to total assets. Banks with higher 
operating costs are expected to have higher interest spreads. 
Bank liquidity (liquid) is defined as the ratio of total operational assets to total bank liabilities. 
This variable is expected to be negatively related to interest spread. An increase in liquidity 
reduces the bank liquidity risk, which reduces the interest spread due to a lower liquidity 
premium charged on loans. 
Service revenues include mainly revenues from fee collection. Operational revenues include 
service plus interest revenues. The ratio of service revenues to operational revenues (servr) 
proxies for the importance of bank’s off-balance sheet activities. Angbazo (1997) argues that 
off-balance sheet activities have two opposing effects on banks. On one hand, off-balance 
sheet activities “should increase profitability since they permit banks to expand in investments 
that would be passed up if restricted to equity- or deposit-financing” (p. 76). But, on the other 
hand, since these activities are subject to lower capital requirements, there is a moral hazard 
effect that may lead banks to “increase off-balance sheet activities in a manner that increases 
asset risk and enhances the subsidy value of deposit insurance if the premium does not reflect 
the marginal risk associated with new investment opportunities” (p. 76).  
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The bank net worth (netw) is a summary measure of its earnings performance. The effect of 
the net worth on interest spread is expected to be negative. Large net worth provides a cushion 
for banks to better face different risks involved in its activities, which reduces the interest 
spread. 
The leverage ratio (lever) is defined as the ratio of total liabilities plus net worth to bank net 
worth. An increase in the leverage ratio is interpreted as an increase in the bank solvency risk, 
which is conducive to higher interest spread. 
A dummy variable for foreign-controlled banks (forgn) was also included in the regression. 
In the second-step regression, the estimate of the pure spread is related to a set of 
macroeconomic variables, which include the market interest rate, a risk premium measure, 
inflation rate, output growth, the required reserves on demand deposits, and financial taxation. 
The market interest rate is the overnight Selic rate. The proxy for risk premium is the C-bond 
spread over a US Treasury bond of equivalent maturity. The inflation rate is measured as the 
monthly rate of change of the general price index (IGP-DI) as calculated by Fundação Getúlio 
Vargas.
12 Output growth is measured by the first difference of the logarithm of the seasonally 
adjusted industrial production series as calculated by IBGE. Financial taxation is the burden 
of indirect taxes on a typical loan operation funded with 30-day certificates of deposits.
13 
One expects that the bank interest spread increases when the basic interest rate (irate) or the 
proxy for risk premium (ivol) increase. The same is expected to happen when inflation rate 
(infl), or the required reserves on demand deposits (rres), or financial taxation (tax) increase. 
As for the effect of output growth (ygr) on interest spread, it can be either positive or 
negative. On one hand, higher output growth signals a greater demand for bank loans, leading 
banks to charge more on their loans. On the other hand, to the extent that economic growth is 
indicative of increased competition and macroeconomic stability, one can expect that lower 
spread is associated with stronger growth. 
                                                       
12 The measure of inflation used in this study is not the same as the one targeted by the Central Bank as part of 
the inflation targeting monetary regime. The last one is a consumer price index, IPCA calculated by Fundação 
IBGE. We chose a broader price index due to the fact that the focus of this paper is overall bank loans, both to 
households as well as to companies.  
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7. Results 
The first-step equation was estimated by means of a within-group estimator where the 
observations for each bank constitute a group. This estimation procedure amounts to estimate 
equation (3) by ordinary least squares with the inclusion of time dummy variables for each 
month in the sample. Dynamic adjustments of the bank spread to changes in the regressors are 
allowed through the inclusion of lagged terms in the equation. Six lags of each variable were 
included in the unrestricted model. Non-significant terms are then excluded. The statistic of 
the Wald test on the validity of the imposed restrictions is equal to 39.65 for a Chi-squared 
(30) distribution [p-value equal to 0.112]. Equation (5) reports the implied long-run results of 
the first-step regression:
14 
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The results of the first-step regressions suggest that large banks charge higher interest spreads 
but the coefficient is not precisely estimated though. 
The ratio of non-interest bearing deposits to total operational assets (nibd) affects positively 
the interest spread. One reason for this positive link is related to the fact that the opportunity 
cost of non-interest bearing reserves increases when nibd is high, leading banks to charge 
higher spreads. 
The same reason can explain why the ratio of interest-bearing funds to earning assets (ibf) is 
negative in equation (5). 
                                                                                                                                                                      
13 The taxes considered in the analysis are the IOF (Tax on Financial Operations), PIS-COFINS (Taxes on Gross 
Revenues), and CPMF (Tax on Debit Transactions).  
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As expected, operating costs (opc) act to increase the bank interest margin. The expected 
negative sign for liquidity (liquid), however, is not confirmed. 
The ratio of service revenues to operational revenues (servr) is found to have a positive 
impact on the interest spread. To the extent that this variable proxies for the relevance of off 
balance sheet activities, our results may be capturing some moral hazard behavior due to the 
regulatory treatment of such activities leading to higher asset risk and, as a result, to higher 
bank spread as well. 
The variable bank net worth (netw) is completely eliminated in the specification search. 
An increase in bank leverage (lever) is associated with higher interest margins due, probably, 
to higher solvency risk. The estimated coefficient for this variable is not statistically 
significant though. 
The dummy variable for foreign-controlled banks (frgn) is negative indicating that these 
banks charge lower interest spreads on average. 
The estimated values for the constant term plus the coefficients on the time dummy variables 
are our measure of the bank pure spread. Figure 4 contrasts the estimate for the pure spread 
with the average bank spread. The average bank spread is calculated for the whole banking 
system rather than for the banks present in our sample. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
14 The long run shows the sum of the coefficients of each variable at its significant lags. In order to spare space, 
the coefficients on the time dummy variables are not reported. The estimated standard deviations for each 
coefficient are based on the robust Huber-White sandwich estimators. The t-values are reported in parentheses.  
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Both series track each other fairly closely up to October 1999. In the first part of the sample 
the actual bank spread was larger than the estimated pure spread whereas the opposite seems 
to be true towards the end of the period. 
These results suggest that microeconomic factors (in the form of individual differences 
amongst banks) do not seem to be a major determinant of interest spreads in Brazil.
15 The lack 
of influence of microeconomic factors on the interest spread is even more pronounced after 
October 1999 when the Brazilian Central Bank launched a series of measures with the aim of 
reducing the interest spreads (see Section 3). 
It remains to be presented the possible relevance of the macroeconomic factors as 
determinants of the interest margin in the country. 
The second step regression makes use of a general to particular specification search. First, an 
unrestricted model is estimated. The unrestricted model is a distributed lag one with five lags 
                                                       
15 Recall that the pure spread is what one would observe for the interest spread after accounting for the influence 
of the microeconomic factors. Thus, if such factors were relevant one would expect to find a large displacement 
between the pure and actual spreads.  
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of the explanatory variables included. Second, a reduction process is implemented through the 
elimination of the non-significant variables. The final model is the restricted version of the 
two-step equation. Third and last, the long-run implied equation is computed from the 
restricted model. 
The long run solution associated to the estimated restricted equation is shown below:
16 
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The restricted equation shows no sign of mis-specification. Moreover, the imposed 
restrictions are not rejected by the data. The Wald statistic on the restriction is equal to 0.503, 
with a F(11,5) distribution [p-value is equal to 0.8411]. 
The results suggest that the pure spread increases with rises in either the basic interest rate or 
in the risk premium, as expected. Increases in the required reserves are also accompanied by 
surges in the interest spread, although the coefficient is not statistically significant. The 
impacts of the output growth and of the financial taxation are also to increase the bank spread. 
Contrary to expectations, however, inflation rate affects negatively the pure spread. One 
possible explanation for this finding is that inflation may be capturing the effect of bank 
seigniorage collection on interest spreads. Commercial banks collect segniorage (or an 
inflation tax) on non-interest bearing demand deposits. According to Cardoso (2002), when 
seigniorage revenue (or inflationary revenue) falls, commercial banks can pass this loss of 
revenue on to depositors who will receive lower interest rates on deposits and to borrowers 
who will face higher interest rate on loans. One would therefore observe higher interest 
spreads. Cardoso (2002) finds empirical support for this relation for the post-Real period in 
Brazil. 
                                                       
16 The t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Some diagnostic tests are also reported: AR1 is a Wald test for the 
presence of serial auto-correlation of order one; ARCH1 is a Wald test for the presence of ARCH residuals of 
order one; Normality is Jarque-Bera test for normal residuals; and RESET is Ramsey regression specification test 
for functional form mis-specification. See Doornik and Hendry (1996) for further details.  
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The high coefficient of determination of equation (6) suggests that macroeconomic factors are 
important determinants of the bank interest spread in Brazil. 
The constant term in equation (6) shows what one would expect for the estimated spread once 
the macroeconomic factors have been accounted for. Ho and Saunders (1981) interpret this 
coefficient as measuring the impact of market power on the bank interest margin. The 
significance for this term suggests that other factors apart from those controlled for in the 
regressions may be relevant to explain the movements of the pure spread. Market power can 
be one of such factor although the results obtained by Nakane (2001), showing that the 
banking industry in Brazil is fairly competitive, do not support this conjecture. Regulatory 
restrictions in the form of compulsory credit at subsidized rates for rural and real estate loans 
are another contender. 
8. Conclusions 
Bank interest spread in Brazil has shown an impressive downward trend in the recent period. 
A stable macroeconomic environment as well as the official priority given to the reduction of 
the interest margins are the main factors behind this behavior. 
Another important feature of bank interest spreads in Brazil is its high and persistent cross-
sectional dispersion. These elements disclose a market where productive inefficiencies and 
regulatory burden allow that some banks keep operating even charging rates much higher than 
their rivals. 
These stylized facts are consistent with the findings of our econometric results. Using a panel 
data of 142 Brazilian banks for the February 1997-November 2000 period, the two-step 
approach due to Ho and Saunders (1981) is implemented. The results show the relevance of 
the macroeconomic conditions over bank’s observable characteristics as the main 
determinants of bank interest spreads in Brazil. However, some yet unidentified factors still 
account for a large portion of the spread behavior in the country. 
Despite all the recent developments, bank interest margins in Brazil have remained stubbornly 
high by international standards. It is not clear if further reductions can still be expected from 
the development of the macroeconomic conditions. Given the nature of the cross-section 
dispersion of the interest spread, we foresee that the possible trend is now for such rates to be  
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more and more affected by changes in the microeconomic environment that shakes the 
industry structure and modifies the behavior of the different banks towards reducing slack and 
improving managerial practices. 
As far as the Central Bank is concerned, we envision a world with the primacy of the 
prudential regulation and supervision tools over the traditional short-term monetary policy 
instruments as the most effective ways to ensure a convergence of the best-practices in the 
local banking industry towards the international benchmarks. 
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